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Educational policies and the gender gap in test scores:  
A cross-country analysis  
 
Zoltán Hermann - Marianna Kopasz 
Abstract  
 
Girls tend to outperform boys in reading tests, while they usually lag behind boys in 
math. However, the size of the gender gap varies to a great extent between countries. 
While the existing literature explains these differences as being mainly due to cultural 
factors, this paper explores whether this cross-country variation is related to educational 
policies like tracking, grade retention, and individualised teaching practices. The gender 
test score gap is analysed in math, reading and science using the PISA 2012 dataset. 
Multilevel models are used in the estimation. The results suggest that the extent of the 
gender gap is indeed associated with certain characteristics of the various education 
systems. First, applying a difference-in-differences estimation method, it was found that 
early tracking has a direct effect on the gender gap in test scores, in favour of girls. 
Second, suggestive evidence shows that more student-oriented teaching practices also 
benefit girls relative to boys, both between and within countries, and within schools. 
Finally, grade retention is correlated with the gender gap, though there is further 
evidence suggesting that this correlation is very unlikely to represent a causal effect.  
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Az oktatási intézményrendszer és a nemek szerinti 
tesztpontszám-különbségek nemzetközi 
összehasonlításban 
 
Hermann Zoltán - Kopasz Marianna 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
A szövegértés teszteken a lányok átlagosan jobb eredményt érnek el a fiúknál, 
matematikából viszont rendszerint gyengébben teljesítenek. Ugyanakkor a nemek közötti 
különbségek mértéke országonként nagyon változó. Míg az irodalom főként kulturális 
különbségekkel magyarázza ezeket az eltéréseket, ez a tanulmány az oktatási 
intézményrendszer olyan jellemzőinek hatását vizsgálja, mint az iskolatípusok közötti 
korai szelekció, az évismétlés elterjedtsége és a diák-orientált pedagógiai módszerek 
alkalmazása. A nemek közötti különbségeket a szövegértés, matematika és 
természettudomány terén vizsgáljuk, a 2012-es PISA adatbázis adatain.  
Az elemzés többszintű modellekre épül. Az eredmények azt mutatják, hogy a nemek 
közötti különbségek összefüggenek az oktatási rendszer jellemzőivel. Először, a 
különbségek különbsége módszerét alkalmazó elemzés azt mutatja, hogy az iskolatípusok 
közötti korai szelekció közvetlen hatása a lányok számára kedvező. Másodszor, az 
eredmények arra utalnak, hogy a diák-orientált tanítási gyakorlat is relative kedvezhet a 
lányoknak. Végül, az évismétlés gyakoriság alkalmazása a fiúk relatív előnyével jár 
együtt, de a részletesebb elemzések arra utalnak, hogy ebben az esetben nem oksági 
hatásról van szó.  
 
JEL: I21, J24 
 
Kulcsszavak: nemek közötti különbségek, iskolatípusok közötti korai szelekció, 
évismétlés, pedagógiai gyakorlat, PISA, többszintű modell, különbségek különbsége 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Gender differences in educational achievement are a well-known phenomenon. In most 
countries, boys score higher in mathematics tests, while girls tend to do better in 
reading. This is a concern for policy-makers since, in spite of the increase in higher 
education enrolment, girls are still heavily underrepresented in STEM (Science, 
Technology, Engineering and Mathematics) fields (see, e.g. OECD 2015). At the same 
time, in recent decades, girls have been closing the test score gap in subjects traditionally 
favouring boys, like mathematics and science, while extending their advantage in reading 
literacy (Marks 2008; Baye and Monseur 2016). In recent decades female educational 
attainment has also risen rapidly, and in most of the developed countries more women 
than men obtain a higher education degree. These trends are often regarded as a 
symptom of the so-called ‘boy crisis’. The widening gender gap in educational attainment 
in the era of labour market polarization can lead to increasing inequalities and 
decreasing labour market participation among men (Pekkarinen 2012). Nevertheless, 
research on the test score gap still focuses mainly on girls’ disadvantage in mathematics 
(Stoet and Geary 2015). 
It is also well documented that the gender test score gap varies remarkably between 
countries (Schnepf 2004; Marks 2008; Fryer and Levitt 2010). In some countries, girls 
lag behind boys in math by a considerable margin, while in others they are on average at 
par. Similarly, in some cases, girls outdistance boys in reading to a considerable degree, 
while at the other extreme, only a narrow gap can be observed. The comparative gender 
gap research seeking explanations for these differences almost exclusively focuses on the 
role of cultural factors, social norms and female participation in the labour market and 
politics (see, e.g. Penner 2008; Guiso et al. 2008; Else-Quest et al. 2010).  Cross-country 
differences in the gender gap are for the most part linked to gender inequalities in society 
and, to a lesser extent, to gender role attitudes and beliefs. Studies in the former line of 
research are often based on the gender stratification hypothesis, first proposed by Baker 
and Jones (1993). They mostly focus on the cross-country differences in women’s social 
participation, such as participation in education, the labour market or politics. This 
thread of research assumes that women’s lower rates of participation in education and 
the labour market (e.g. Baker and Jones 1993; Penner 2008), lower participation in 
politics (e.g. Guiso et al. 2008, Else-Quest et al. 2010) produce a gender stratification in 
which women are assigned lower status. This shapes the behaviour of students, parents 
and teachers (Baker and Jones 1993; Else-Quest et al. 2010; Riegl-Crumb 2005). If 
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female students are faced with fewer educational and occupational opportunities than 
male students, then they may see mathematics as less important for their future and be 
reinforced in this belief by parents, teachers and friends. (Baker and Jones 1993). 
However, the existing evidence is mixed. Some studies conclude that there is a link 
between gender inequality measures (e.g. women’s participation in politics, the labour 
market, etc., or composite indicators of gender inequality) and the gender test score gap 
(e.g. Riegl-Crumb 2005; Else-Quest et al. 2010; Guiso et al. 2008; González de San 
Román and De la Rica Goiricelaya 2012). Others challenge this conclusion (Fryer and 
Lewitt 2010; Stoet and Geary 2015).  
At the same time, it seems obvious that schools play a decisive role in mediating the 
effects of societal and cultural factors. Indirect evidence also suggests that schools indeed 
affect the gender gap in achievement. The gender gap in mathematics abilities opens up 
after children enter school (Fryer and Levitt 2010), and in school this gap increases with 
age (i.e. from primary school to secondary school) both in reading, mathematics and 
science (Baye and Monseur 2016). Moreover, schooling seems to have heterogeneous 
effects across gender. Boys appear to benefit more from higher school quality (Autor et 
al. 2016) and perceived teacher quality (Hochweber and Vieluf 2018) than girls. 
As the gender gap seems to be formed in schools, it is natural to assume that the 
specific characteristics of various education systems affect the cross-country differences 
in the gender gap (Ayalon and Livneh 2013). Prior research shows that the gender gaps 
in reading and mathematics are highly correlated at the country level (van Langen et al. 
2006; Guiso et al. 2008; Marks 2008; González de San Román and De la Rica 
Goiricelaya 2012). In other words, where girls have a larger advantage in reading over 
boys, they also tend to have a smaller disadvantage in mathematics. This suggests that 
cross-country differences in the gender gap are not determined by educational policies 
specific to a given subject (i.e. the curriculum in math) (Marks 2008), but rather, that 
broader educational institutions and policies are at work.  
However, the effect of national educational policies has hardly been addressed in the 
literature, and the few existing studies focus on the homogeneity of school systems. 
Higher degrees of standardization and integration in the education system were found to 
be associated with a higher relative performance by girls (Ayalon and Livneh 2013; Van 
Langen et al. 2006). At the same time, early tracking seems to benefit boys (Van Hek 
2017). Altogether, prior evidence is scarce, and confined to a limited set of educational 
institutions. 
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This study seeks to contribute to filling this void by analysing the relationship 
between educational policies and gender differences in educational performance from a 
cross-country perspective. More specifically, the focus is on three policies: early tracking, 
the extensive use of grade retention, and the incidence of individualised teaching 
practices. These are very different features, but all of these are among the key 
educational policies that education systems use to manage the heterogeneity of the 
student population (Mons 2004; 2007). In this respect these policies have similar 
functions. We ask whether, and if so, how these educational policies affect the gender 
gap in mathematics, reading, and science test scores.  
This question is addressed using a two-stage empirical strategy. First, the association 
between the gender gap and the educational policies is explored. In this stage, multilevel 
regression models are employed including all three educational policy variables at the 
same time. Second further evidence on the effect of each policy variable separately is 
provided. The effect of grade retention is tested indirectly, by comparing its effects in 
different parts of the performance distribution. For early tracking, its direct effect is 
identified using a difference-in-differences strategy. Finally, suggestive evidence is 
offered concerning the effects of individualised teaching relying on within-country and 
within-school variation in teaching practices. 
In this paper, data from the 2012 wave of OECD’s PISA programme is used. For the 
analysis of early tracking, these are supplemented by the IEA’s PIRLS and TIMSS data 
from 2006 and 2007. PISA provides data on students’ test scores in mathematics, 
reading, and science for more than sixty countries, including all OECD member 
countries. Here, data for a single cross-section are used, as the cross-country patterns of 
the gender gap hardly change over time. 
The contribution made here to the literature is threefold. First, the evidence on the 
relationship between educational policies and gender differences in student achievement 
is scarce. This study explores the effects of three educational policies. Two of these, grade 
retention and teaching practice, have not been analysed in this context before. Second, 
most of the evidence on cross-country differences in the gender gap is descriptive, 
confined to correlations. In this paper, the causal effect of early tracking is identified, and 
suggestive evidence provided in the case of the other two policy variables. Third, despite 
the fact that the disadvantage of boys in reading is a growing concern, the vast majority 
of the gender gap literature focuses on mathematics only. In contrast, this paper covers 
three fields of competence. Analysing mathematics, science and reading within one 
study, it is possible to shed light on which policies favour boys or girls, and in which field 
of competence.  
8 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  In the next section, the context 
of the research is outlined and a review provided of previous research investigating the 
effects of educational policies on gender differences. Section 3 describes the data and the 
estimation methods used. In Section 4 the results are presented. Finally, Section 5 draws 
conclusions.  
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND RELATED LITERATURE 
 
Prior evidence suggests that the cross-country differences of the gender test score gap are 
related to the characteristics of educational systems. However, this literature looked at 
only a few educational institutions. Van Langen et al. (2006) examine the degree of 
integration for the educational systems (measured by such factors as grade and track 
differentiation, number of tracks, socioeconomic, gender and immigrant segregation, 
and quality differences) in relation to the gender gap. Integrated educational systems are 
found to be more favourable to the achievement of girls (in mathematics, science and 
reading) than differentiated ones.  
Ayalon and Livneh (2013) address the gender effects of educational standardization. 
They report a significant level of association between the degree of standardization and 
gender difference in mathematics test scores. According to this, a higher degree of 
standardization (i.e. the use of national examinations and the higher uniformity in time 
devoted to various mathematics topics) is linked to a reduced gender gap in mathematics 
test scores. An apparently different conclusion is reached for reading performance by 
Van Hek (2017). She demonstrates that a higher degree of standardization is associated 
with a larger gender gap (favouring girls) in reading achievement. However, boys 
outperform girls in mathematics, while lagging behind in reading. Hence, both studies 
suggest that standardization provides relative benefits for girls.  
Van Hek (2017) also explored the relationship between the gender achievement gap 
and early tracking in the cross-country context. She found that the gender gap in reading 
scores is smaller in countries that track students at an early age, i.e. early tracking 
provides relative benefits to boys. 
These studies are motivated by the research into the effect of educational institutions 
on inequality of opportunity. This thread in the literature asks how educational 
institutions shape the effect of family background on students’ educational achievement. 
In international comparison, the key question is why some countries are more successful 
in offsetting socio-economic inequalities and ensuring greater equality of opportunity in 
schools than others. Early tracking and standardization are key themes in this literature 
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(van de Werhofst 2015; Hanushek and Woessmann 2010). It is natural to ask whether 
the mechanisms behind educational policies affecting socioeconomic inequalities in 
achievement also affect gender inequality. 
This paper seeks to contribute to the literature on the cross-country differences in the 
gender test score gap by exploring the effect of other educational policies. The analysis is 
informed by the theoretical framework elaborated by Mons (2004; 2007, see also 
Dupriez et al. 2008); she starts from the observation that in response to students’ diverse 
abilities, school systems use different policies to manage heterogeneity in the student 
population. She identifies four key educational policies developed to deal with student 
heterogeneity: tracking, ability grouping, grade retention, and individualised teaching 
practices. Tracking and ability grouping allow for student sorting based on ability and 
motivation, resulting in more homogeneous classes. In theory, this leaves room for 
adjusting the level and content of education to fit students’ needs better. Grade retention 
decreases heterogeneity within classes by holding back students who cannot meet 
minimum achievement standards. Finally, the use of individualised teaching practices 
implies allocating additional teacher time and attention to help low-achievers. Mons 
argues that though the countries studied rely on a mix of these measures, one of them 
tended to become predominant in most cases. Based on the particular policy mix 
implemented in a given country, Mons (2004; 2007) and Janmaat and Mons (2011) 
distinguish between four models of heterogeneity management. Selective school systems 
use early tracking, while comprehensive school systems rely on either ability grouping 
within and across schools or frequent grade retention or individualised teaching 
practices to deal with student heterogeneity. 
The first model, the ‘separation model’, is characterized by a short common core 
curriculum and the introduction of separate tracks from the end of primary school. 
Students are placed on tracks mainly on the basis of their educational achievement. 
Ability grouping and frequent use of grade retention are also important characteristics of 
this model. This type of school system can be observed in central European countries 
(Austria, Germany, Hungary, and Switzerland).  
The ‘individualised integration model’ is the archetype of the comprehensive school 
concept. It has the following characteristics: a long common curriculum, automatic 
promotion of students, heterogeneous classrooms and use of individualised teaching. 
This model is adopted by the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and 
Sweden). 
Another model of the comprehensive school system is the so-called ‘à la carte 
integration model’. Its features are a long common curriculum, automatic promotion, or 
a low rate of grade retention, a flexible ability grouping in secondary schools, and 
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individualised teaching. This model can be found in Canada, New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom and the United States.  
The last model of the comprehensive school system is the so-called ‘uniform 
integration model’. This refers to an educational system with a long common core 
curriculum, a high incidence of grade retention and ability grouping from lower 
secondary schools. The countries belonging to this model are France, Italy, Portugal, and 
Spain. 
A very similar approach is taken by two subsequent reports by the OECD (2010, 
2013b). The OECD uses the terms vertical and horizontal differentiation. (The 2013 
report uses the term ’stratification’ instead of differentiation, though with a similar 
meaning.) Vertical differentiation refers to how students progress through the education 
system as they get older. In some countries, all 15-year old students attend the same 
grade level, while in other countries they are dispersed throughout various grade levels 
as a result of policies affecting the school entrance age or grade retention. Horizontal 
differentiation refers to the differences in instruction within a grade or education level. 
At the system level, horizontal differentiation can be applied by schools that select 
students on the basis of their academic records, by offering specific programs (e.g. 
vocational and academic). At the school level, individual schools can apply horizontal 
differentiation by grouping students according to ability or transferring student out of 
the school.  
Though these policies have similar functions, the empirical evidence suggest that 
they are not equally effective. There are large differences in equality of opportunity 
across countries (Schütz et al. 2008) and also across the types identified by Mons 
(Dupriez et al. 2008; Castejon and Zancajo 2015). 
Seeking to explain cross-country differences in the gender gap the effects of these 
policies on the gender gap are explored. Only three of the four policies are investigated, 
ignoring ability grouping, as no reliable and comparable measure is available on that at 
the country level. Prior research lends support to the assumption that these policies may 
matter, as it suggests that boys and girls are affected differently by these policies.  
The effect of grade retention on student achievement at the individual level is often 
hotly debated. The empirical evidence is mixed and fairly controversial. The general 
conclusion is that grade retention has either no effect or has a negative impact on student 
performance (Jimerson et al. 2002; Jimerson et al. 2006; Martin 2009; Manacorda 
2012). At the student level, grade retention effect is most often found not to differ by 
gender (Martin 2009; Ikeda and Garcia 2014). In contrast, Morrison and No (2007) 
report a more detrimental impact on boys. At the same time, it is often observed that 
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boys stand a higher risk of repeating a grade than girls (Jimerson et al. 2006; Martin, 
2009). This implies that if repeating a grade has a direct effect on student achievement, 
boys are affected to a greater extent by grade retention policies overall, due to their 
higher exposure to this policy.  
A similar argument holds for early tracking. The empirical evidence largely confirms 
that early tracking strengthens the influence of parental background on students’ 
educational achievement, as tracking has a detrimental effect on low-achievers 
(Hanushek and Wößmann 2006; Schütz et al. 2008; Bol and Van de Werfhorst 2013; 
Lavrijsen and Nicaise 2015). At the same time, in tracking regimes boys tend to be more 
often placed in lower tracks, resulting in a lower enrolment share in the vocational tracks 
among girls (Van Hek, 2017). This implies that altogether the differences in educational 
quality across tracks affect boys more than girls. 
Some direct evidence on the effect of early tracking on the gender gap is also 
available. Pekkarinen (2008), analysing the effect of a Finnish comprehensive school 
reform of the 1970s, reports that the shift from a selective school system to a 
comprehensive one had a positive effect on girls' probability of choosing the academic 
track later, whereas this effect was slightly negative for boys. These findings suggest that 
postponing tracking favours girls. 
With regard to teaching practices, the empirical literature most often contrasts two 
types: lecture-style teaching and teaching based on problem-solving. The former is often 
associated with more traditional, didactic teacher-centred teaching styles, while the 
letter is associated with more modern, interactive, student-oriented teaching styles 
(Schwerdt and Wuppermann 2010). The latter can be conceived as similar to 
individualised teaching in the terminology of Mons (2007). The existing evidence on the 
impact of teaching practices on student achievement is mixed. Based on data for the 
U.S., Brewer and Goldhaber (1997) and Schwerdt and Wuppermann (2011) find that 
teaching based on in-class problem solving (as opposed to lecture-style teaching) is 
associated with lower student achievement. Analysing Spanish data, Hidalgo-Cabrillana 
and Lopez-Mayan (2015) conclude that modern teaching practices are associated with 
better student performance, especially in reading, while traditional practices if anything, 
are disadvantageous. These effects differ according to gender: girls gain from modern 
practices and lose from traditional ones, while boys do not benefit from any particular 
teaching style. Korbel and Paulus (2017) investigated the effect of teaching practices on 
non-cognitive skills using Czech data and found that the effects are different by gender.  
Overall, the evidence suggests that these policies may have an impact on the gender 
gap.  
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In the remainder of this section, previous work on the effects of early tracking and 
grade retention is reviewed in more detail, with special attention to results on the links 
between educational policies and the socioeconomic inequalities of student performance. 
We assume that the mechanisms that produce the effects of educational policies on 
socioeconomic inequality in achievement also affect gender inequality.  
The age at which students choose between different tracks varies between countries. 
In general, in comprehensive school systems, students attend the same schools 
throughout lower secondary school, while in selective school systems they have already 
been sorted into different (academic or vocational) tracks at this stage. 
Of the educational policies examined here, it is tracking that has been the most 
extensively studied. In the related literature, some studies look at its effect on the 
inequality of student performance (inequality as dispersion); while other studies assess 
its effect on the inequality of opportunity (the extent to which performance is influenced 
by the family background). In the first line of research, employing differences-in-
differences estimations, Hanushek and Wößmann (2006) demonstrate that early 
tracking leads to an increase in inequality of student performance between the end of 
primary and the end of lower-secondary school.  
The other line of the early tracking research focuses on the effect of tracking on 
equality of opportunity. There are good reasons for assuming that early selection 
increases the effect of family background on educational attainment. Children with a 
disadvantaged background are more likely to end up in lower tracks, where education 
quality is lower, and the learning environment is generally less stimulating, for several 
reasons. Tracking systems often sorts students on the basis of previous performance. As 
the gap in abilities and school performance across socioeconomic groups appear at early 
ages (Cunha et al. 2006), track sorting is likely to correlate with family background. 
Further, the educational ambitions of pupils are influenced by the role models they 
encounter in their surroundings; children of parents of low socioeconomic status tend to 
have more modest aspirations than those of parents of high socioeconomic status (Breen 
and Goldthorpe 1997). When track choice is made in early grades, family background has 
a stronger effect on it (Brunello and Checchi 2007).  
The empirical evidence largely confirms that early tracking strengthens the influence 
of parental background on students’ educational achievement (e.g. Schütz et al. 2008; 
Horn 2009; Bol and Van de Werfhorst 2013). However, these cross-sectional studies 
suffer from the weakness that many other factors may influence the effect of social 
background on educational performance as well. Ammermüller (2005) and Waldinger 
(2007) employed a difference-in-differences strategy, combining achievement data for 
10-11 and 15 years old students, to identify the effect of early tracking on equality of 
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opportunity in a cross-country context. Ammermüller (2005) found that the effect of 
students’ social origin on reading performance increased (between primary and 
secondary school) more in countries that track students at an early age. In contrast to 
this finding, Waldinger (2007) reports that though the family background is more 
important in early tracking countries, tracking does not increase its effect on test scores. 
Recently, Lavrijsen and Nicaise (2015), using the same estimation strategy on a larger 
sample of countries, found that the effect of social origin on reading outcome in 
secondary school is stronger in countries that are characterized by early tracking.  
In summary, the evidence indicates that early tracking is associated with an increase 
in inequality of student achievement and inequality of opportunity. 
The desirability of grade retention is a highly debated issue (see, e.g. Belot and 
Vandenberghe 2011; Manacorda 2012). Some countries practise automatic grade 
promotion (i.e. a system which allows pupils to be promoted to higher grades 
independently of their performance), while other countries use grade retention. 
Opponents of grade retention emphasize that repeating a grade does not lead to 
improvement in students’ academic achievement (McCoy and Reynolds 2003), while 
increases the probability of dropping out of school (Jimerson et al. 2002). At the same 
time, proponents of grade retention argue that it might improve educational 
achievement by reinforcing a student’s knowledge. Also, grade repetition might help 
make classes more homogeneous. 
Although the strongest argument in favour of grade repetition is that it may be a 
deterrent to low educational performance (Manacorda 2012), the empirical literature on 
grade repetition focuses almost exclusively on its ex-post (i.e. treatment) effects on grade 
repeaters (Belot and Vandenberghe 2011; Foureaux Koppensteiner 2013). The results 
from this line of research are contradictory and depend on the context and age of 
students (see, e.g. Foureaux Koppensteiner 2013). 
The threat (i.e. ex-ante) effects of grade repetition policies have received little 
attention so far. The few exceptions include studies by Belot and Vandenberghe (2011), 
Battistin and Schizzerotto (2012), and Foureaux Koppensteiner 2013.  Again, the results 
are mixed, with positive as well as negative (or no) effects of the threat of grade 
repetition on educational performance. 
Cross-country studies related to the effects of grade retention are very rare. Based on 
analyses of data from PISA 2009 and 2012, OECD reports (2011; 2013b) suggest that 
school systems with high rates of grade retention are also school systems that show lower 
student achievement. These reports go one step further, analysing the association 
between the incidence of grade retention and the effect of students’ social background on 
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educational outcome. Findings show that in countries with a higher proportion of 
retained students, social background has a stronger impact on educational outcomes 
than in countries where fewer students repeat grades – even after accounting for the 
country’s national income (OECD 2011; 2013b).  
3. DATA AND METHODS  
3.1. DATA 
The primary dataset used in this paper is the 2012 wave of the OECD Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA). PISA is a survey of 15-year-old students in 
which skills in different domains are assessed: mathematics, literacy and science, with 
the major focus on mathematical literacy in 2012. PISA 2012 was implemented in 65 
countries, including all 34 OECD member countries. We use a single wave of PISA, as the 
cross-country patterns of the gender gap hardly change over time. Moreover, measures 
of teaching practices in math are available only for 2012. 
Our final sample contains 472,074 students from 62 countries. Cyprus is not 
included in the available data set, while Lichtenstein is excluded due to the small number 
of observations. Furthermore, Taiwan is also excluded as the Global Gender Gap Index is 
not available. 
Besides the PISA data, student achievement data from the Progress in International 
Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS) and the Trends in International Mathematics and 
Science Study (TIMSS) datasets are used in Section 5.2.  PIRLS and TIMSS are 
standardised student achievement testing programmes similar to PISA carried out by the 
International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA). PIRLS 
tests students at grade four in reading, and TIMSS tests students in mathematics and 
science. 
3.2. VARIABLES 
The dependent variables in the analysis are math, reading and science test scores, 
standardized within each country, so that the mean is 0, and standard deviation is 1. In 
this way any differences in the overall level of performance between countries are 
removed from the data and the gender differences are directly comparable across 
countries. 
The key variables describe educational policies at the country level. Tracking is 
measured as the age at which students are first tracked into different school types. Data 
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on the age of first selection are gathered from the OECD (2013b). The tracking variable is 
truncated at the age of 15, since it is assumed that achievement measured at this age is 
not affected by tracking that occurs later. 
Data on grade retention were gathered from the PISA student questionnaire. The 
country-level variable is measured as the share of students who have repeated a grade at 
least once at either the primary or secondary level. In the regressions, the natural 
logarithm of this variable is used, as it fits the data better.   
To measure individualised teaching the index student-orientated teaching practices 
developed by the OECD (2013a) is used. This index was constructed using students’ 
reports on the frequency with which, in mathematics lessons, the teacher gives different 
work to classmates who have difficulties learning and/or to those who can advance 
faster; the teacher assigns projects that require at least one week to complete; the teacher 
has students work in small groups to come up with a joint solution to a problem or task; 
and the teacher asks students to help plan classroom activities or topics (OECD 2013a). 
Higher values of the index indicate the more intensive use of student orientated 
practices. It should be noted that, though measuring teacher classroom behaviour based 
on students’ responses may contain considerable measurement error, student-reported 
measures are more closely related to student achievement than those reported by 
teachers (Hidalgo-Cabrillana and Lopez-Mayan 2015). The questions on teaching 
practices in PISA 2012 refer to mathematics lessons only. This measure is used as a 
proxy for teaching practices in general at the country level, assuming a strong correlation 
between subjects. In other words, it is assumed that teaching practices reflect a general 
pedagogical approach and teaching culture rather than subject-specific methodological 
differences at the country level. At the same time, when comparing schools within 
countries this correlation cannot be presumed; hence, the effect of teaching practices 
across and within schools is analyzed only in the case of mathematics. 
In the analysis gender stratification is controlled for by the use of one composite 
index of gender inequality: the Global Gender Gap Index (GGI), prepared by the World 
Economic Forum (2009 data). This index is widely used in the literature (Guiso et al. 
2008; Fryer and Levitt 2010) and available to most of the PISA countries. The GGI is 
comprised of four sub-indices which measure economic participation and opportunity, 
educational attainment, political empowerment, health, and survival. Larger GGI values 
indicate a better position of women in society. Other composite indicators are also 
available, however, a meta-analysis by Else-Quest et al. (2010) concludes that, along with 
the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), the GGI proved to be the best predictor of 
the gender gap in mathematics on PISA. As the practice has been in previous studies, per 
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capita GDP (logarithmic form) is also a control. GDP data as reported by the World Bank 
for 2011 are used.  
In the estimated models two student characteristics are controlled for: immigrant 
background and parental education. 
Summary statistics for the key country-level variables are displayed in Table 1. It 
should be noted that all the educational policy variables display a significant degree of 
variation from country to country. 
Table 1  
Descriptive statistics of country-level variables 
 
 N minimum maximum mean standard 
deviation 
Gender gap  
(male-female) 
     
Math gender gap (PISA) 62 -0.282 0.365 0.092 0.123 
Reading gender gap (PISA) 62 -0.862 -0.136 -0.444 0.142 
Science gender gap (PISA) 62 -0.548 0.245 -0.029 0.134 
Math gender gap (TIMSS) 27 -0.270 0.213 0.037 0.123 
Reading gender gap 
(PIRLS) 
30 -0.420 -0.054 -0.209 0.093 
Science gender gap 
(TIMSS) 
27 -0.252 0.196 0.016 0.122 
Educational policy 
variables 
     
Tracking age 62 10 15 14.178 1.499 
Grade retention (log) 62 -0.693 3.717 2.046 1.184 
Individualised teaching 62 -0.579 1.081 0.205 0.397 
Country-level controls      
Gender Gap Index  62 0.400 0.828 0.696 0.069 
GDP per capita (log) 62 8.459 11.794 10.192 0.654 
Note: Variables derived from PIRLS and TIMSS are calculated for PISA countries only. 
 
Besides the variables used in the analysis, Table 1 also presents country-level 
measures of the gender gap in the three subjects. The gender gap is calculated as the 
weighted mean score of males minus the weighted mean score of females.  
In reading, boys lag behind girls in each country by a considerable margin; the gap 
typically falls between standard deviations (SD) of -0.1 and -0.9. At the same time, in 
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most countries, on average, boys outperform girls in mathematics. However, the 
difference tends to be smaller; while in a few countries girls are on a par with or better 
than boys. In the case of science the picture is mixed, with boys in some countries 
performing better, while in others, girls excel. The gap typically varies between -0.5 and 
0.2 SD. It is important to note that the gender gaps in the three domains correlate 
strongly at the country level. In countries where girls have a large advantage in reading, 
they also tend to close the gap in mathematics and perform better than boys in science 
(Marks 2008).  
Table A1 in the Appendix gives descriptive statistics on the gender gap between 
countries and subjects. Figure A1 in the Appendix depicts the correlations of the gender 
gaps in the three domains. 
3.3. ESTIMATION METHODS 
We explore the effects of educational policies on the gender gap using multilevel 
regression models. These models are similar to those used in the existing literature to 
estimate the effect of standardization and early tracking (Ayalon-Livneh 2013; Van Hek 
2017). Our baseline model contains two levels, the individual and the country level: 
(1) 
 
where A is the test score of student i in country j, X is a set of M individual student 
characteristics, including the dummy variable F denoting female students and Z is the set 
of L country-level variables, including the three educational policy measures mentioned 
above and country-level controls. The β parameters correspond to the first level of the 
model, while the γ0l and γ1l coefficients represent the country-level effects. The µ and ε 
parameters represent the random part of the model, µ1j denoting the random gender 
slope in country j. 
The key parameters are the γ1l coefficients representing the effects of the female 
student – education policy interaction terms. These coefficients indicate whether the 
presence of an educational policy on average goes together with an additional 
(dis)advantage to girls relative to boys, compared to countries where this policy is used 
to a lesser extent.  
In the second stage of the analysis, further evidence is provided on the effects of the 
three education policy variables separately, extending the model in different directions. 
Unfortunately, the available data does not often allow for proper identification of causal 
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effects in a country-level analysis. Hence various empirical strategies were employed. 
First, an indirect implication of grade retention effects was tested by re-estimating the 
baseline model and comparing the results for subsamples of students over different parts 
of the performance distribution. Grade retention might be expected to have a direct 
effect only on low achievers, implying different correlations across the distribution. The 
direct effect of early tracking is then analysed employing a difference-in-differences 
strategy, augmenting the dataset with 4th graders and adding further interaction terms to 
the baseline model. Here the question of whether the gender achievement gap develops 
differently between grade 4 and age 15 in tracking and non-tracking countries is tested. 
Finally, suggestive evidence is provided concerning the effect of individualised teaching 
exploiting the variation between and within schools. Here a three-level model is 
employed, extending the baseline model with a school level. The exact model 
specifications are described at the beginning of each section. 
It should be noted that only the difference-in-differences analysis of the tracking 
effect can be considered as a causal identification strategy per se. In the other cases, 
suggestive evidence is provided that is non-causal, but none the less helps to assess the 
effects of educational policies on the gender gap. 
The models are estimated using the weights provided in the PISA data. In the two-
level models, the final student weights are used, while in the three-level model, schools 
are weighted by the school weights and students within schools by conditional student 
weights. The final student weights and the school weights are rescaled to give an equal 
sum for each country. 
In order to take into account the fact that key variables are measured at the country 
level, robust standard errors are calculated and clustered at the country level.   
4. RESULTS 
 
Before turning to the results of the multilevel models, country-level bivariate correlations 
between the gender achievement gap and our three educational policy measures are 
presented.  Figures A2 to A4 in the Appendix are scatter plots showing the relationships 
between the gender test score gap in each subject (mathematics, reading, and science) 
and the educational policies (tracking, grade retention, and individualised teaching), 
while table A2 shows the pairwise correlation coefficients. The results suggest a positive 
correlation between the gender gap and grade retention and a negative correlation with 
individualised teaching. Regarding tracking age, no association could be found in math 
and reading and only a weak negative correlation in science. The figures suggest a linear 
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relationship with individualised teaching and grade retention, the latter measured on a 
log scale.  
4.1 BASELINE MODEL 
Table 2 presents the results of the base multilevel model. As between-country gender 
inequality is represented by the variation of the gender slope, the key parameters of 
interest are the interaction terms of gender and the education policy variables.  
The results suggest that grade retention has the most consistent correlation with the 
gender gap. The share of students who have repeated a grade is statistically significant 
for all three subjects. The negative coefficients indicate that a higher rate of grade 
retention tends to be favourable to boys. In other words, on average, girls perform better 
relative to boys in countries where grade retention is less prevalent. This implies that a 
strict grade retention policy goes together with a larger gender gap in math, as on 
average boys outperform girls in math in most countries, and with a smaller gap in 
reading. 
Individualised teaching also seems to matter. It is significantly associated with the 
gender gap in math and science, and it is marginally insignificant for reading (p=0.103). 
These results suggest that the widespread use of student-oriented teaching practices 
conveys more benefits to girls, especially in math and science.  
As opposed to grade retention and individualised teaching, tracking age appears to 
have no effect on the gender slope in the baseline model presented here. The coefficients 
are highly nonsignificant for each subject. These results seem to contradict the findings 
of Van Hek (2017), who reports a positive effect of the tracking age on the gender slope in 
reading. However, she estimated this positive effect in a three-level model including 
schools as a separate level and, thus, controlling for sorting across schools. In that 
setting, the positive effect is conditional on sorting. In contrast, the two-level model here 
represents the unconditional association. It is to be noted that schools play an important 
mediating role, as sorting is part of the mechanism behind the tracking effect (Skopek 
and Dronkers 2015). Hence, in order to estimate the total effect, sorting across schools 
should not be controlled for.  
How large is the estimated effect of individualised teaching and grade retention?  
In order to assess effect size, it is important to note that the standard deviation of log 
grade retention at the country level is about three times that of the student-oriented 
teaching indicator (see Table 1). Taking this into account, the two-to-five times larger 
coefficients of student-oriented teaching indicate an effect of similar magnitude. In other 
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words, a one standard deviation change of log grade retention and the index of student-
oriented teaching implies a similar change in the gender gap. 
Finally, the results regarding societal gender equality are mixed. Higher levels of the 
gender inequality index are related to boys performing relatively better in science than 
girls, though the coefficient is significant only at the 10 percent level. For math and 
reading, no sign can be found of the gender equality effect. On the whole, no firm 
evidence was to be found for an association between gender equality and the gender gap 
in test scores. This finding is in line with the conclusion reached by Stoet and Geary 
(2014). 
Overall this first set of results suggests that two of the three educational policies are 
associated with the gender gap at the country level. A higher frequency of grade retention 
tends to favour boys, while more individualised teaching practices appear to benefit girls 
relative to boys, especially in the case of mathematics and science. At the same time, 
early tracking is not associated with the gender gap.  
However, it is important to emphasize that these coefficients represent country-level 
correlations. This is prima facie evidence, which does not necessarily represent causal 
effects, and thus requires further verification. In the following sections, further evidence 
is sought for the effects of the three policy variables, using various empirical strategies.  
Table 2  
Education policies and the gender test score gap: baseline model 
 
 
math reading science 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
     student variables 
   female -0.306 0.623** 0.0718 
 
(0.214) (0.305) (0.248) 
parental education: lower secondary or below -0.327*** -0.318*** -0.324*** 
 
(0.0237) (0.0249) (0.0246) 
parental education: tertiary 0.383*** 0.363*** 0.377*** 
 
(0.0171) (0.0158) (0.0168) 
immigrant background -0.0509 -0.0587 -0.0900 
 
(0.0576) (0.0538) (0.0599) 
     country variables 
   log grade retention  0.0662*** 0.0590*** 0.0595*** 
 
(0.0114) (0.0128) (0.0123) 
tracking age 0.00399 0.00502 0.00215 
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(0.00754) (0.00739) (0.00781) 
student-oriented teaching -0.0784** -0.0540 -0.0807* 
 
(0.0395) (0.0467) (0.0442) 
Gender Gap Index -0.356* -0.345* -0.217 
 
(0.182) (0.190) (0.192) 
log GDP per capita -0.0737** -0.0444 -0.0531 
 
(0.0351) (0.0368) (0.0388) 
     cross-level interactions 
   female X log grade retention  -0.0454*** -0.0376** -0.0311** 
 
(0.0121) (0.0149) (0.0132) 
female X tracking age -0.00503 -0.00694 0.00103 
 
(0.00692) (0.00710) (0.00683) 
female X student-oriented teaching 0.152*** 0.0961 0.162*** 
 
(0.0401) (0.0589) (0.0483) 
female X Gender Gap Index -0.0508 -0.0693 -0.353* 
 
(0.165) (0.242) (0.210) 
female X log GDP per capita 0.0389** 0.00382 0.0229 
 
(0.0196) (0.0268) (0.0224) 
constant 0.739** 0.169 0.420 
 
(0.377) (0.388) (0.413) 
    Observations 472,074 472,074 472,074 
Number of countries 62 62 62 
Robust standard errors clustered at the country-level in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
4.2. GRADE RETENTION 
The results of our baseline model suggest that grade retention is closely related to the 
gender gap. The higher the share of grade repeaters in a country, the better boys perform 
relative to girls on average. However, it should be pointed out that interpreting this 
association thus, in causal terms may well be mistaken. To provide further evidence an 
indirect implication of grade retention effects is tested.   
In most cases, students repeating a grade fail to reach a minimum standard. Cross-
country differences in grade retention occur as these standards may differ between 
countries or because performing below standard does not necessarily incur repeating a 
grade in some countries. In either case, if grade retention has a direct effect on the 
gender gap (e.g. repeating a grade affects student performance differently by gender, or 
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the threat of it motivates boys more than girls), its effect should be stronger on low-
achievers. As high-achievers rarely repeat a grade, they are directly not affected by the 
retention rate.  
This implication was tested by comparing grade retention effects on the gender gap 
measured in different parts of the test score distribution. The sample within each country 
was split into three groups with respect to the test score and the baseline model for the 
low, middle, and high-achiever groups was estimated separately. The set of independent 
variables in the model remain unchanged.  
Table 3 gives the estimated coefficients for the education policy – female student 
interaction terms. The results show no marked differences across the test score 
distribution in the association between grade retention and the gender gap. A higher 
retention rate goes together with the better performance of boys relative to girls both 
among low- and high-achievers. For math, the estimated coefficients are almost identical 
in the three groups. For reading and science, the coefficients slightly decrease moving 
upwards on the achievement scale, but pairwise tests of the equality of the coefficients 
across the groups reveal no statistically significant differences.  
At the same time, the coefficients for early tracking and individualised teaching 
slightly differ across the three achievement groups. Individualised teaching is associated 
with a higher advantage for girls in reading in the middle- and high-achiever groups, 
significant at the 10 percent level. Early tracking seems to benefit boys relative to girls in 
reading among high-achievers. 
Besides comparing the achievement group, an indirect test can be applied in which 
students with low and higher levels of parental education are compared. The data shows 
that students with a disadvantaged family background are prone to grade retention to a 
larger extent. Therefore the argument for low achievers holds here, as well. The results 
are also similar (Table A3 in the Appendix). The coefficient of grade retention on the 
gender slope is somewhat larger among poor students, but the difference is statistically 
not significant. 
Consequently, our indirect test does not support the existence of a direct effect; 
retention policies per se hardly affect the gender gap.  It is more likely that retention 
policy is correlated with other characteristics of the education systems that influence the 
gender test score gap, and represents the effects of these unobserved factors in country-
level regressions.   
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Table 3 
Education policies and the gender test score gap:  
low-, middle- and high- achievers 
 
 
Math  Reading Science  
 
(1) (2) (3) 
    Low-achievers 
   female X log grade retention  -0.0469*** -0.0457*** -0.0370** 
 (0.0122) (0.0164) (0.0145) 
female X tracking age 0.00232 0.00349 0.00860 
 (0.00780) (0.00913) (0.00848) 
female X student-oriented teaching 0.131*** 0.0687 0.130** 
 (0.0459) (0.0706) (0.0563) 
     Middle-achievers    
female X log grade retention  -0.0487*** -0.0387** -0.0358** 
 (0.0136) (0.0162) (0.0141) 
female X tracking age -0.00906 -0.0123 -0.00428 
 (0.00790) (0.00799) (0.00691) 
female X student-oriented teaching 0.167*** 0.116* 0.189*** 
 
(0.0424) (0.0617) (0.0504) 
     High-achievers    
female X log grade retention  -0.0479*** -0.0344** -0.0280** 
 (0.0136) (0.0138) (0.0135) 
female X tracking age -0.00946 -0.0129** -0.00258 
 
(0.00623) (0.00645) (0.00639) 
female X student-oriented teaching 0.140*** 0.0884* 0.153*** 
 (0.0380) (0.0451) (0.0394) 
Each panel represents the cross-level interactions from a separate regression estimate. Model 
specification is identical to that in Table 2. Robust standard errors clustered at the country-level 
are given in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
4.3. EARLY TRACKING 
In this section, we investigate further the correlation between the gender gap and early 
tracking.  The baseline model reveals no significant association here. However, these 
estimates are prone to omitted variable bias, which may in turn conceal the true effect of 
early selection.  
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To test the direct effects of early tracking a difference-in-differences approach was 
employed (see Ammermüller 2005; Waldinger 2006; Lavrijsen and Nicaise 2015). This 
approach builds on the observation that early tracking should not affect student 
achievement in primary education, which is untracked in every country. At the same 
time, other educational institutions can be assumed to shape student performance 
similarly at the primary and secondary levels. Under this assumption, a difference-in-
differences approach identifies the causal effect of early tracking on inequalities. In other 
words, any changes between the end of the primary level and the end of the lower-
secondary level should reflect the effect of early tracking. 
Combining PISA data with PIRLS or TIMSS datasets measuring achievement in the 
fourth grade provides an ideal setting, as PISA measures students after tracking has 
taken place in early tracking countries, while in late tracking countries there is no 
tracking at the age of 15.  
Figure 1     
The gender test score gap (F-M) in reading in primary and secondary 
education, and early tracking 
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Figure 1 demonstrates the idea of the difference-in-differences estimation strategy in 
the case of reading (for mathematics and science see Figure A5 in the Appendix). The 
figure depicts the gender gap in reading test scores in primary education, measured in 
PIRLS 2006 for fourth graders and in secondary education, measured in PISA 2012 for 
the 15-year-olds. As may immediately be seen, the gender gap widens in every country, 
except Great Britain. The advantage of girls in reading ranges roughly from 0 to 0.4 SD 
in primary education. At the secondary level, they outperform boys by a larger margin, 
between 0.2 and 0.7 SD. 
Also, Figure 1 compares early and late tracking countries. First, it should be noted 
that early tracking appears to go together with a smaller advantage of girls in primary 
education. The gender gap is between 0 and 0.2 for most of these countries in grade four, 
and girls have a relatively larger advantage only in Bulgaria, Slovenia and Singapore. At 
the same time, the size of the gender gap in late tracking countries typically falls into the 
range between 0.1 and 0.4 (except Spain). Looking at the 15-year-old populations, the 
girls’ advantage is still larger on average in late tracking countries.  
However, if the change in the gender gap from primary to secondary education in the 
two country groups is compared, the patterns show an interesting difference. The dashed 
lines in the figure represent the values for the gender gap that might be expected at the 
secondary level, given the value of the gender gap at the primary level. The short and 
long dashed lines correspond to early and late or non-tracking countries respectively. At 
a given level of the gender gap in primary education, girls’ advantage tends to increase 
more in early tracking countries. 
To test the direct effect of early selection formally, the PISA dataset was augmented 
with the PIRLS and TIMSS samples of 4th graders. An indicator variable P denoting PISA 
students was defined and interaction terms added to the baseline model. In this way a 
third level was added, but it was included in the fixed part of the model. 
Note that the straightforward way for specifying a difference-in-differences model in 
this setting would include country fixed effects instead of random effects. A random 
effects multilevel model was used in order to maintain an integrated framework for the 
analysis and provide results comparable to those derived from the baseline model. The 
multilevel difference-in-differences model is: 
(2) 
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where T is the measure of tracking. Student-level control variables are not included, as 
parental education not measured in the PIRLS and TIMSS datasets. The α and π 
parameters represent the interaction terms, i.e. the changes in the parameters from 
grade 4 to the age 15. It should be noted that besides tracking, interaction terms of P and 
the other country-level variables are not included as the effect of these is not expected to 
change with the age of students. The coefficient  α1 represents the increase in the gender 
gap from primary to secondary education in general. The parameter of main interest is 
π1, representing the differential increase of the gender gap in secondary education in 
early- and late- or non-tracking countries.   
Table 4 gives the estimates for the education policy–female student interaction 
effects. In columns 1, 3 and 5 tracking is measured with the age of selection under age 15, 
as before. In the other columns, a dummy variable specification is employed, as is 
frequently the case in the tracking literature. Non-tracking denotes countries that use a 
comprehensive school system or track students later than the age of 141. The number of 
countries is about the half that found the full PISA sample, as here only those countries 
participating both in the PISA and the PIRLS or TIMSS program at fourth grade level are 
included. 
These results stand in sharp contrast to the patterns of the baseline model, as early 
tracking is significantly related to the gender slope of test scores.  
The key variable here is the triple interaction term of tracking, secondary level 
education and female student. Its coefficient is statistically significant for each subject in 
both specifications. This indicates that in tracking countries the gender gap evolves in a 
way significantly different to that in the non-tracking group from primary to secondary 
education. 
The triple interaction term has a negative effect, suggesting that later tracking 
impairs the performance of girls relative to boys. The dummy variable specifications tell 
the same story: in non-tracking countries, girls’ advantage in reading decreases, while 
the gap in math widens.  
Overall, these results suggest that girls gain with early tracking relative to boys. This 
is not surprising, as boys enrol in vocational tracks more often than girls. Consequently, 
after tracking more boys than girls receive a lower level and lower quality of schooling in 
academic subjects. 
 
 
                                                 
1 An indicator for non-tracking is used instead of early tracking to have a coefficient with similar 
sign to tracking age. 
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Table 4  
Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of early tracking on the 
gender test score gap 
 
 
Math  Reading  
 
Science 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
female X log grade 
retention -0.0323*  -0.0330*  -0.0324* -0.0329* -0.0217 -0.0233 
 (0.0177) (0.0172) (0.0177) (0.0184) (0.0190) (0.0190) 
female X tracking age 0.00860  0.0113*  0.0213***  
 (0.00744)  (0.00595)  (0.00666)  
female X non-tracking   0.0342  0.0475**  0.0756*** 
  (0.0284)  (0.0241)  (0.0293) 
female X individualised 
teaching 0.125*** 0.128*** 0.106** 0.106** 0.120** 0.123** 
 (0.0405) (0.0421) (0.0525) (0.0482) (0.0488) (0.0487) 
female X tracking age X 
PISA -0.0137*  -0.0156*  -0.0203**  
 (0.00724)  (0.00899)  (0.00860)  
female X non-tracking 
X PISA  -0.0663**  -0.0679**  
-
0.0889*** 
  (0.0297)  (0.0311)  (0.0329) 
       
Observations 350,562 350,562 396,189 396,189 350,562 350,562 
Number of countries 27 27 30 30 27 27 
Country-level variables as in Table 2. Additional controls: indicator variable of PISA 
observations, female students, and the interaction of PISA observations and female 
students. Robust standard errors clustered at the country-level are given in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
These results appear to contradict the effects estimated by Pekkarinen (2008). 
Analysing the comprehensive education reform in Finland, he found that girls gained 
more with the postponement of tracking. The differences in the results might be related 
to the different outcome measures (educational attainment and wages versus test 
scores), but are also likely to be related to the different societal context of the early 70s 
when the Finnish school reform took place. 
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It is important to emphasize that these effects represent the direct causal impact of 
tracking. The multilevel model also allows us to estimate the general association of 
tracking and the gender gap, net of this direct effect, at the same time. The coefficients of 
the double interaction terms in Table 4 suggest that in early tracking countries girls tend 
to perform relatively worse than boys in reading and science before tracking takes place. 
For math, the coefficients are not significant, but are similar in magnitude, with the same 
sign. These effects can hardly be attributed to tracking itself. Instead, they imply that 
some other features of the education system, correlated with early tracking, generate 
relative advantages for boys in these countries. 
Here, it should be noted that the direct effect of tracking and the effect of its 
unobserved correlates have opposite signs. In the baseline model, the sum of these two 
effects was estimated, and they were found to cancel out, resulting in no relationship at 
age 15. 
In summary, the implication is that in early tracking countries boys’ relative 
advantage over girls is larger in primary school compared to non-tracking countries, but 
later boys suffer losses due to tracking. As these two effects offset each other, there is no 
correlation at age 15. 
It is also interesting to compare the coefficients of the other two policy variables with 
those estimated in the baseline model. These variables have the same interpretation, the 
two models differ only in the sample. The effects for a restricted set of countries are 
estimated here, while the sample contains two age cohorts of students. In spite of these 
differences, the results are very similar. Grade retention is associated with relative 
disadvantages to girls, though the coefficients are significant only for reading and math, 
at the 10 percent level. At the same time, individualised teaching goes together with girls 
performing relatively better in each subject. This effect is more compellingly 
demonstrated in this sample than in the baseline model. 
 
4.4. INDIVIDUALISED TEACHING 
Finally, we turn to individualised teaching. The baseline model shows that in a cross-
country comparison more student-oriented teaching practices seem to benefit girls in 
each of the three subjects. In contrast to grade retention and early tracking, there is no 
straightforward way to provide further evidence concerning these factors at the country 
level. Hence we are looking at individualised teaching effects within countries. It is 
assumed that if this factor and related policies do indeed affect the gender gap, the effect 
can be recognized at the school and student level too, since in most countries there is 
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ample variation in individualised teaching both between and within schools. However, 
due to potential selectivity and endogeneity biases these estimates should not be 
interpreted as evidence of a causal relationship.  
In order to estimate the effect within countries, the baseline model was extended by 
the addition of a third level, that of schools. The extended model is as follows: 
(3) 
 
 
where S is a set of N school characteristics for school k in country j, including the school 
mean of the index of student-oriented teaching. Other school-level controls are the mean 
of the socio-economic status index (ESCS), the share of girls, private school status, urban 
location and the share of students studying at the upper-secondary level. All these 
variables are allowed to have an effect on both the level the test scores and the gender 
slope. The key coefficient is δ1 representing the individualised teaching effect on the 
gender slope at the school level.  
In this approach, within country and between school variance in teaching practices is 
exploited. A major problem with this approach is that neither students nor teachers can 
be expected to be randomly distributed across schools. Teachers are often matched to 
students in a non-random fashion, and the sorting of students and teachers results in 
selection bias in the estimation of the effects of teaching practices and school 
characteristics (Kane et al. 2011). To mitigate these biases a second model was analysed, 
relying on within-school variation only, which is independent of sorting across schools. 
In this second specification, an index of student-oriented teaching and its interaction 
with gender at the student level is added. The coefficient of this interaction term 
represents the within-school effect. 
These models were estimated for mathematics scores only, as in PISA 2012 teacher 
behaviour was measured for mathematics lessons. While at the country level these 
variables are likely to be appropriate proxies for teacher behaviour in general, this is less 
likely the case within countries, at the school or class level. For example, a mathematics 
teacher in class A employing more student-oriented practices than the mathematics 
teacher in class B is probably a very weak predictor of the difference in the behaviour of 
the science teachers in the two classes. Hence we confine the within-country analysis to 
mathematics. 
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Table 5 shows the results. Columns 1 and 2 represent the within-country and the 
within-school model for the full sample, while the remaining columns refer to the 
subsamples of early tracking and non-tracking countries.  
Table 5 
Within-country and within school effects of student-oriented teaching 
practices on the gender gap in mathematics test scores 
 
 
Full 
sample 
 
Early 
tracking 
countries 
 
Non- 
tracking 
countries 
 
 
Within-
country 
model 
Within-
school 
model 
Within-
country 
model 
Within-
school 
model 
Within-
country 
model 
Within-
school 
model 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
female  -1.170*** -1.109*** -1.010** -1.179** -1.078*** -0.963*** 
 (0.214) (0.209) (0.510) (0.571) (0.267) (0.271) 
student-oriented 
teaching  -0.176***  -0.179***  -0.173*** 
  (0.00899)  (0.0133)  (0.0115) 
female X student-
oriented teaching  0.0370***  0.0421***  0.0354*** 
  (0.00735)  (0.0100)  (0.00962) 
student-oriented 
teaching (school mean) -0.385*** -0.241*** -0.392*** -0.250*** -0.373*** -0.228*** 
 (0.0244) (0.0280) (0.0472) (0.0494) (0.0291) (0.0335) 
female X student-
oriented teaching 
(school mean) 0.0551*** 0.0189 0.0449** 0.0127 0.0628*** 0.0253 
 (0.0135) (0.0183) (0.0202) (0.0292) (0.0175) (0.0233) 
       
Observations 470,944 306,279 126,398 82,524 344,546 223,755 
Number of schools 17,901 17,901 4,811 4,811 13,090 13,090 
Number of countries 62 62 18 18 44 44 
The models include student-level controls and country-level variables and interactions as 
in Table 2. School-level controls are mean ESCS, the share of girls, private school status, 
urban location and the share of students at the upper-secondary level, and interactions 
with female student.  Robust standard errors clustered at the country-level are shown in 
parentheses.   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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In the within-country models student-oriented teaching in the school has a 
significant impact on the gender slope (Column 1 of Table 5). The more prevalent 
individualised teaching practices are, the better girls perform in math relative to boys. At 
the same time, student-oriented teaching practices go together with a lower overall level 
of test scores. The results are similar in early tracking and non-tracking countries, which 
shows that the effect of student-oriented teaching is not driven by differences between 
tracks. 
The within-school effects reflects the same pattern (Column 2 of Table 5). Girls seem 
to benefit more from individualised teaching relative to boys. In these models, the school 
mean of student-oriented teaching is not significantly related to the gender slope due to 
multicollinearity; the student- and school level measures are highly correlated. 
Altogether, within-country and within-school estimates are in line with the country-
level effects estimated in the baseline model. More student-oriented teaching practices 
appear to improve the test scores of girls relative to boys significantly. Though causal 
effects cannot be identified here, this evidence lends further support to the supposition 
that more student-oriented teaching practices are indeed relatively beneficial for girls 
and reduce the test score gap in mathematics. 
It should be noted that the measure of individualised teaching is prone to 
simultaneity bias, as student performance might influence how the individual students 
report teaching practices. Teaching practices may influence student achievement, but 
teachers can also deal with high and low performers differently. Moreover, teaching 
practices are reported by students in the PISA dataset, and students’ perception may also 
depend on achievement to some extent. In order to curb simultaneity problems in a third 
specification, student-oriented teaching for groups within schools is measured instead of 
individual students. Averaging is expected to remove the bulk of the simultaneity bias. As 
classes cannot be identified in the PISA dataset, groups of students are defined within 
schools by grade and track, when there is tracking. It should be borne in mind that we do 
not rely on the variance between classes at the same grade, which might well reflect non-
random sorting. The within-school variance used to identify teacher behaviour effects 
comes mostly from differences across grades. Teachers are unlikely to be allocated to 
different grades with respect to teacher quality. If the student-level measure of student-
oriented teaching is replaced with this group-level measure and the within-school 
models of Table 5 are re-estimated, the results remain unchanged2.  
                                                 
2 Results for the subsamples of countries are available from the authors upon request. 
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As the estimated effects might vary across countries, more homogeneous groups of 
countries were selected to explore this heterogeneity, such as countries where teaching is 
more or less student-oriented overall, and where the majority of students are studying at 
the lower or upper secondary level. The results in these subsamples are qualitatively 
identical to those of Table 53. 
4.5. ROBUSTNESS  
 
It is to be suspected that estimates relying on cross-country variation depend heavily on 
the particular sample of countries used in the analysis. Due to the small number of 
observations, results might be sensitive to the inclusion of a few influential cases in the 
sample. Regarding the gender test score gap, international differences in school 
enrolment among the 15-years-old raise a special concern. While in developed countries 
by and large the full population of youth is observed in school, in several countries a 
substantial share of children drop out before the age of 15. Moreover, sample selection in 
more traditional societies may occur differently across gender as schooling or dropping-
out decisions might well differ between boys and girls. At the same time, education 
policies might also be different in countries with lower and potentially gender-biased 
enrolment. Facing these concerns, each of the models above was re-estimated for a 
restricted sample of 47 countries, excluding those with an enrolment rate below 90 
percent at age 15. Moreover, the analyses were repeated for the sample of 32 OECD 
countries within the high-enrolment group, as well4. 
Table 6 presents the results for the key variables in the two restricted samples. The 
results for the high-enrolment sample are qualitatively similar to that for the full sample. 
The effect of individualised teaching on the gender slope is positive; its size is larger than 
found in the full sample. The effect of grade retention is negative, as before, though its 
size is limited compared to the full sample, and it is statistically significant only for math.  
In the OECD sample coefficients for grade retention are similar to those in the high-
enrolment sample, with a statistically significant effect only for mathematics, but the 
sign is negative for each subject. However, the effect of individualised teaching cannot be 
detected in this sample. It should be noted that the coefficients for the OECD sample are 
estimated reliably due to the smaller sample size of 32 countries, and stronger 
multicollinearity among the country level variables.  
                                                 
3 Results for the subsamples of countries are available from the authors upon request. 
4 Two OECD countries are excluded from this sample due to low enrolment rates: Mexico and 
Turkey. 
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Table 6  
Educational policies and the gender test score gap:  
two subsamples of countries 
 
 
 
High-
enrolment 
sample   
OECD 
sample   
  Math Reading Science  Math Reading Science  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
female X log 
grade 
retention  -0.0245* -0.0211 -0.00543 -0.0233* -0.0191 -0.00669 
 
(0.0142) (0.0174) (0.0140) (0.0123) (0.0145) (0.0113) 
female X 
tracking age -0.00146 -0.00337 0.00838 -0.00292 -0.0105 0.00473 
 
(0.00773) (0.00784) (0.00757) (0.00714) (0.00656) (0.00607) 
female X 
student-
oriented 
teaching 0.180*** 0.153** 0.203*** -0.00289 -0.0566 -0.0328 
 (0.0479) (0.0603) (0.0581) (0.0703) (0.0665) (0.0516) 
       Observations 346,270 346,270 346,270 256,762 256,762 256,762 
Number of 
countries 47 47 47 32 32 32 
Model specification identical to Table 2. Robust standard errors clustered at the country-
level are given in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Also, the models of Section 4.2.-4.4. were re-estimated in the case of the two 
subsamples. The results match closely those for the full sample5. Estimating the country-
level regressions for the low-, middle- and high-achiever subsamples to test the effect of 
grade retention, and within-country and within-schools estimates of individualized 
teaching effects are robust to restricting the sample of countries. Results for high-
enrolment countries and OECD countries are qualitatively identical to the results for the 
full sample. The only notable differences are the less precise estimates of the difference-
                                                 
5 Results for the subsamples of countries are available from the authors upon request. 
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in-differences model for mathematics in the OECD sample. However, these coefficients 
have the same sign, while estimates for reading and science mirror those for the full 
sample despite small sample sizes (17 and 21 OECD countries in the TIMSS-PISA and 
PIRLS-PISA samples respectively).  
Another concern is related to the impact of particular groups of countries on the 
results. For example, Fryer and Levitt (2010) found that Muslim countries form a group 
of outliers regarding the effect of the Gender Gap Index. Our results are robust to 
including a dummy variable for Muslim countries. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Based on the 2012 wave of PISA data, the relationships between different educational 
policies and the gender test score gap were assessed from a cross-country perspective. 
The analysis covered all three fields of competence measured in PISA: mathematics, 
reading and science. The effects of three educational policies that education systems use 
to manage student heterogeneity were examined: early tracking, grade retention and 
individualised teaching.   
There is almost no empirical evidence on the role of these educational policies in the 
cross-country differences in the gender test score gap, despite the large variation in the 
gender gap between countries. The notable exceptions are Van Langen et al. (2006), 
Ayalon and Livneh (2013) and Van Hek (2017), focusing on the effects of integration of 
the schooling system, standardization and early tracking. 
In this study, a two-stage empirical strategy was pursued. First, the association 
between the three policy variables and the gender gap was analysed using a simple 
multilevel model. Further evidence on the impact of each policy variable was then 
examined by extending the model in different ways. Using a difference-in-differences 
method, the causal effect of early tracking was identified. In the case of grade retention, 
an indirect implication was tested by comparing the effect on different parts of the 
performance distribution. Finally, suggestive evidence was provided on the effect of 
individualised teaching by estimating within-country and within-school models. 
Altogether, the results presented here suggest that education policies do have an 
impact on the gender gap in test scores. First, more individualised teaching practices 
seem to improve the performance of girls relative to boys. This association can be 
observed both at the country level and within countries. Though a causal effect cannot be 
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identified here, a direct impact is likely to exist, given the suggestive evidence from 
within-country and within-school models.  
Second, analysing the evolution of the gender gap from primary to secondary 
education provides strong evidence for early tracking directly benefiting girls relative to 
boys. This effect is likely to emerge from unequal sorting across tracks, as girls are 
underrepresented in the vocational track that provides the lowest level education in 
academic subjects. 
Third, indirect evidence suggests that other characteristics of the education systems 
also play an important role in shaping gender inequalities in school. At the country level 
grade retention is related to the gender gap, it appears to favour boys. However, further 
evidence suggests that it is very unlikely to have a causal effect. Boys also perform 
relatively better in early tracking countries at grade 4, i.e. before tracking takes place. 
Again, a causal effect is implausible. These correlations suggest the presence of other 
factors at work here, omitted in the analysis and correlated with grade retention or early 
tracking. This points to the importance of further research on the role of educational 
policies in shaping the gender differences in educational achievement. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1.  
Gender test score gaps 
 
Math Science Reading Math Science Reading 
PISA PISA PISA TIMSS TIMSS PIRLS 
Albania -0,008 
 
-0,078 *** -0,136 *** 
      Argentina 0,189 *** -0,082 ** -0,414 *** 
      Australia 0,131 *** 0,047 
 
-0,366 *** 0,073 * 0,060 
   Austria  0,247 *** 0,097 
 
-0,416 *** 0,213 *** 0,181 *** -0,164 *** 
Belgium  0,112 *** 0,040 
 
-0,322 *** 
    
-0,088 *** 
Brazil 0,223 *** 0,006 
 
-0,390 *** 
      Bulgaria -0,027 
 
-0,206 *** -0,609 *** 
    
-0,263 *** 
Canada  0,118 *** 0,032 
 
-0,400 *** 0,111 *** 0,065 *** -0,191 *** 
Chile 0,322 *** 0,089 ** -0,307 *** 
      Chinese Taipei 0,047 
 
0,012 
 
-0,368 *** 0,031 
 
0,025 
 
-0,213 *** 
Colombia 0,360 *** 0,245 *** -0,234 *** 0,206 *** 0,169 *** 
  Costa Rica 0,365 *** 0,181 *** -0,362 *** 
      Croatia 0,135 *** -0,028 
 
-0,583 *** 
      Czech Republic   0,128 *** 0,010 
 
-0,457 *** 0,089 ** 0,098 *** 
  Denmark  0,175 *** 0,114 *** -0,373 *** 0,097 ** 0,079 * -0,207 *** 
Dubai (UAE) -0,056 
 
-0,309 *** -0,602 *** -0,162 ** -0,252 *** 
  Estonia 0,068 ** -0,032 
 
-0,565 *** 
      Finland -0,034 
 
-0,186 *** -0,685 *** 
      France  0,089 ** -0,025 
 
-0,416 *** 
    
-0,176 *** 
Germany  0,144 *** -0,006 
 
-0,496 *** 0,183 *** 0,196 *** -0,117 *** 
Greece 0,096 *** -0,159 *** -0,541 *** 
      Hong Kong-China  0,165 *** 0,082 
 
-0,310 *** 0,063 
 
0,045 
 
-0,184 *** 
Hungary  0,099 ** 0,036 
 
-0,445 *** 0,039 
 
0,034 
 
-0,079 ** 
Iceland -0,070 * -0,032 
 
-0,547 *** 
    
-0,304 *** 
Indonesia 0,068 
 
-0,048 
 
-0,402 *** 
    
-0,268 *** 
Ireland  0,187 *** 0,045 
 
-0,344 *** 
      Israel 0,114 
 
-0,007 
 
-0,401 *** 
    
-0,154 *** 
Italy  0,204 *** 0,031 
 
-0,417 *** 0,203 *** 0,167 *** -0,108 *** 
Japan  0,197 *** 0,120 *** -0,256 *** 0,007 
 
-0,015 
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Jordan -0,282 *** -0,548 *** -0,862 *** 
      Kazakhstan 0,007 
 
-0,126 *** -0,534 *** -0,102 ** -0,015 
   Korea 0,186 ** 0,044 
 
-0,279 *** 
      Latvia -0,049 
 
-0,206 *** -0,674 *** -0,039 
 
-0,097 ** -0,393 *** 
Lithuania 0,002 
 
-0,184 *** -0,664 *** 0,003 
 
-0,072 * -0,341 *** 
Luxembourg 0,272 *** 0,155 *** -0,299 *** 
    
-0,054 * 
Macao-China 0,031 
 
-0,018 
 
-0,457 *** 
      Malaysia -0,100 ** -0,149 *** -0,507 *** 
      Mexico  0,198 *** 0,095 *** -0,317 *** 
      Montenegro 0,002 
 
-0,211 *** -0,708 *** 
      Netherlands 0,114 *** 0,035 
 
-0,294 *** 0,174 *** 0,194 *** -0,150 *** 
New Zealand  0,155 *** 0,045 
 
-0,339 *** 0,008 
 
-0,052 
 
-0,287 *** 
Norway  0,024 
 
-0,037 
 
-0,484 *** 0,101 ** 0,032 
 
-0,260 *** 
Peru 0,234 *** 0,080 
 
-0,246 *** 
      Poland  0,046 
 
-0,033 
 
-0,504 *** 
    
-0,234 *** 
Portugal  0,125 *** -0,022 
 
-0,438 *** 
      Qatar -0,166 * -0,345 *** -0,657 *** -0,270 *** -0,218 * -0,420 *** 
Romania 0,049 
 
-0,069 * -0,474 *** 
    
-0,164 *** 
Russia -0,019 
 
-0,069 ** -0,465 *** -0,091 ** -0,052 
 
-0,237 *** 
Serbia 0,105 ** -0,050 
 
-0,524 *** 
      Shanghai-China 0,058 * 0,060 * -0,313 *** 
      Singapore -0,032 
 
-0,006 
 
-0,330 *** -0,078 * 0,001 
 
-0,229 *** 
Slovak Republic  0,096 ** 0,074 * -0,387 *** 0,078 ** 0,100 *** -0,159 *** 
Slovenia 0,038 
 
-0,101 * -0,627 *** 0,076 ** 0,000 
 
-0,287 *** 
Spain  0,194 *** 0,090 *** -0,326 *** 
    
-0,061 * 
Sweden -0,031 
 
-0,077 ** -0,501 *** 0,100 *** -0,026 
 
-0,297 *** 
Switzerland  0,141 *** 0,068 ** -0,417 *** 
      Thailand -0,173 *** -0,270 *** -0,745 *** 
      Tunisia 0,205 *** 0,014 
 
-0,371 *** -0,173 *** -0,231 *** 
  Turkey 0,091 * -0,136 *** -0,557 *** 
      United Kingdom 0,136 *** 0,132 *** -0,266 *** 0,015 
 
-0,030 
 
-0,254 *** 
United States 0,053 * -0,020 
 
-0,346 *** 0,084 *** 0,059 ** -0,143 *** 
Uruguay 0,134 *** -0,012 
 
-0,391 *** 
      Viet Nam 0,120 *** 0,014 
 
-0,441 *** 
      Male-female test score gap. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A2  
Country-level correlations of the gender test score gaps, educational policy and control variables 
 Male-female test score gap: 
log grade 
retention 
tracking 
age 
student-
oriented 
teaching 
Gender 
Gap 
Index 
log GDP 
per 
capita 
 
math reading science 
      
       gender gap: math 1.0000 
                    
        gender gap: reading 0.7049 1.0000 
                   (0.0000) 
       gender gap: science 0.8594 0.8381 1.0000 
     
             (0.0000) 
( 
0.0000) 
      log grade retention   0.4620  0.3236 0.2825 1.0000 
    
 
 
(0.0002)  (0.0103)  (0.0261) 
     tracking age -0.1392 -0.0664 -0.1633 -0.2327 1.0000 
   
 
 (0.2807)  (0.6083)  (0.2048)  (0.0687) 
    student-oriented 
teaching -0.3896 -0.2337 -0.4735 -0.0401  0.2987   1.0000 
                (0.0017)  (0.0676)  (0.0001)  (0.7573)  (0.0184) 
   Gender Gap Index  0.0045  0.0267  0.2026 -0.2004  0.1627 -0.2832 1.0000 
 
 
 (0.9722)  (0.8370)  (0.1143)  (0.1184)  (0.2064)   (0.0257) 
  log GDP per capita -0.0696  0.0460  0.0745  0.0181 -0.1811  -0.3517 0.2454 1.0000 
              (0.5911)  (0.7228)  (0.5652)  (0.8891)  (0.1589)   (0.0051) (0.0545) 
 p-values in parentheses 
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Table A3  
Education policies and the gender test score gap: students with lower and higher levels of parental education 
 
Math  Reading Science  
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Parental education: lower secondary or 
lower 
   female X log grade retention  -0.0622*** -0.0498** -0.0496*** 
 (0.0139) (0.0202) (0.0157) 
female X tracking age 0.00222 -0.00946 -0.00736 
 (0.0134) (0.0105) (0.0124) 
female X student-oriented teaching 0.112*** 0.0799 0.159*** 
 (0.0429) (0.0712) (0.0512) 
Parental education: upper secondary or 
higher    
female X log grade retention  -0.0406*** -0.0341** -0.0268* 
 (0.0130) (0.0154) (0.0140) 
female X tracking age -0.00556 -0.00703 0.00165 
 (0.00728) (0.00747) (0.00714) 
female X student-oriented teaching 0.155*** 0.102* 0.163*** 
 
(0.0418) (0.0605) (0.0502) 
Each panel represents the cross-level interactions from a separate regression estimate. Model 
specification identical to Table 2. Robust standard errors clustered at the country-level are given in 
parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure A1 
The gender test score gap across subjects 
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Figure A2  
The gender test score gap in math and the individual educational policies 
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Figure A3  
The gender test score gap in reading and the individual educational policies 
  
 
 
46 
 
Figure A4  
The gender test score gap in science and the individual educational policies 
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Figure  A5     
The gender test score gap (M-F) in primary and secondary education,  
and early tracking 
AUT
BEL
BGR
DEU
HUN
ITA
LUXNLD
ROU
SGP
SVK
SVN
CAN
DNK
ESP
FRA
GBR
HKG
IDN
ISL
ISR
LTULVA
NOR
NZL
POL
QAT
RUS
SWE
TWN
USA
-.7
-.6
-.5
-.4
-.3
-.2
s
e
c
o
n
d
a
ry
 e
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
-.5 -.4 -.3 -.2 -.1 0
primary education
early tracking fitted values late tracking fitted values
Reading
 
AUT
CZE
DEU
HUN
ITA
NLD
SGP
SVK
SVN
ARE
AUS CAN
COL
DNK
GBR
HKG
JPN
KAZ LTU
LVA
NOR
NZL
QAT
RUS SWE
TUN
TWN USA
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
s
e
c
o
n
d
a
ry
 e
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
-.3 -.2 -.1 0 .1 .2 .3
primary education
early tracking fitted values late tracking fitted values
Math
AUT
CZE
DEU
HUN ITA NLD
SGP
SVK
SVN
ARE
AUS
CAN
COL
DNK
GBR
HKG
JPN
KAZ
LTU
LVA
NOR
NZL
QAT
RUSSWE
TUN TWN
USA
-.4
-.3
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
s
e
c
o
n
d
a
ry
 e
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
-.3 -.2 -.1 0 .1 .2 .3
primary education
early tracking fitted values late tracking fitted values
Science
 
